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from scholars in a variety of fields mainly because it 
can have significant negative effects on communities 
by hindering economic development and decreasing 
economic efficiency and growth (Bardhan, 1997; Dal 
Bó & Rossi, 2007; Rose-Ackerman, 1997; Rose-
Ackerman & Søreide, 2011). Corruption can also 
result in inequitable distribution of resources and 
power across the population, resulting in income and 
opportunity inequalities among individuals. Further-
more, corruption can lower the level of trust in public 
officials and legitimacy of those public offices.
Introduction
Estimates indicate that the annual cost of corrup-
tion surpasses US$2.6 trillion or 5% of global GDP 
(International Chamber of Commerce, Transparency 
International, United Nations Global Compact, & 
World Economic Forum, 2008). Even though the 
cost of corruption estimates varies depending on the 
source, there is a consensus among all reporting agen-
cies that corruption is a very large problem. There-
fore, it has been receiving an increasing attention 
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Perception of corruption in the process of hosting 
a mega-event can have significant negative effects 
on residents’ attitudes and behaviors if the bidding 
and hosting process of a mega-event is not transpar-
ent. Furthermore, if residents believe that officials 
involved in the process are corrupt, spectators might 
face antagonistic hosts, the national image of the host 
country may be damaged, and the national and local 
government officials might lose their own public sup-
port. Even though the process of hosting mega-events 
has been associated with highly competitive bidding 
process and major corruption scandals, the impact 
of corruption perception on residents’ attitudes and 
behaviors have not yet been empirically examined. 
Therefore, this study aims to examine the impact of 
corruption on residents’ impact perceptions and their 
support for hosting a mega-event in their commu-
nity. Furthermore, this study investigates the influ-
ence of transparency on corruption, residents’ impact 
perceptions, and their support for a mega-event by 
focusing on the 2014 FIFA World Cup held in Brazil.
The Brazilian case is particularly relevant because 
of the profound corruption crisis the country faced 
right before hosting the World Cup. One year 
before the event, huge demonstrations against cor-
ruption took millions of people to the streets of 
major cities. Afterward, unprecedented judicial 
processes were carried out, which resulted in the 
imprisonment of top politicians, executives, and 
entrepreneurs. Even the president of the lower 
house of the Congress was imprisoned. The rate of 
approval of the Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff 
plumed because of a series of corruption scandals 
in the government. The president was accused of 
being financially irresponsible and the Chamber 
of Deputies passed her impeach. While this article 
was being written, Brazil was still facing an uphill 
battle against corruption. About US$2 billion had 
been recovered from corrupt officials. Obviously, a 
small portion of all these Brazilian corruption prob-
lems was related to hosting the FIFA World Cup. 
However, because the locals perceive most of the 
public officials as being corrupt, this perception is 
also likely to influence residents’ perceptions and 
support for the FIFA World Cup, especially consid-
ering the fact that organizing and hosting the FIFA 
World Cup requires significant financial resources 
(Giesecke & Madden, 2007). Therefore, Brazil 
offers the ideal conditions for the current study.
Even though corruption can undermine long-term 
sustainable development, economic growth, and 
equality through preferential treatment of certain 
individuals or companies, it has not received much 
attention from tourism scholars (Das & DiRienzo, 
2010; Poprawe, 2015; Saha & Yap, 2015; Yap 
& Saha, 2013). Considering the fact that tourism 
heavily relies on cultural and natural resources, most 
of which tend to be public goods, and requires a sig-
nificant amount of investment, some investors may 
be willing to bribe corrupt officials to get prefer-
ential treatment. This is especially true in the case 
of hosting and organizing mega-events because 
hosting of those mega-events requires government 
to allocate and use significant amount of financial 
resources for building new and/or improving exist-
ing infrastructure and facilities needed to host those 
events (Jennings, 2011; Maennig, 2005; Mason, 
Thibault, & Misener, 2006). Although this new 
investment in infrastructure and facilities can pro-
vide an opportunity for economic growth in host 
destinations, it can also lead to corruption. Consid-
ering the fact that public works construction is reg-
ularly seen as one of the most corrupt industries 
(Olken, 2005), it is not surprising that corruption can 
become a significant issue in hosting mega-events.
Although corruption can happen anywhere, stud-
ies suggest that the level of corruption tends to be 
lower in countries where public decision-making 
process is transparent and public officials are held 
accountable for their actions through internal con-
trol and regulatory oversight (Transparency Inter-
national, 2016). In transparent societies, public 
officers find fewer opportunities for corrupt behav-
iors and face severe consequences. Thus, higher 
transparency is usually associated with lower cor-
ruption. Furthermore, transparency is a precondi-
tion for citizens having trust in their government 
and other public offices. As suggested by the social 
exchange theory (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005), 
a transparent process can provide assurances that 
parties involved in an exchange will not try to 
take advantage of others involved in that exchange 
because of the severe consequences they may face. 
Thus, transparency is likely to increase citizens’ 
trust in the public offices, and therefore provide 
support for the government and other public offi-
cials’ initiatives and actions, especially in the case 
of hosting a mega-event.
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obtaining licenses, achieving specific outcomes on 
legal proceedings, and speeding bureaucratic pro-
cedures (World Bank, 1997). An OECD study on 
foreign bribery offenses reported that 57% of the 
corruption cases are related to bribes for obtain-
ing public procurement contracts (OECD, 2014). 
The report indicated that bribes represent 10.9% of 
the total transaction value and 34.5% of the profits.
Using public office for personal gains is not 
new. Concerns over bribing of public officials and 
corruption were mentioned in some of the most 
ancient texts. For example, Plato complained about 
officials accepting bribes in his Republic (390d). 
Aristotle noted in Politics that “a tyrant . . . has no 
regard to any public interest, except as conducive 
to his private ends; his aim is pleasure, the aim of 
a king, honor.” The philosopher viewed the ruler’s 
personal interests as a perversion against the search 
for the common interest. Similarly, Cicero stated 
in his De Officiis that “for to exploit the state for 
selfish profit is not only immoral; it is criminal, 
infamous.” In classical Greece, public office cor-
ruption was a crime severely punishable, especially 
when it was judged to be contrary to the public 
interest (Buchan & Hill, 2014).
Contrary to ancient Greeks view of public office 
corruption, some studies argue that when the eco-
nomic system is substantially distorted, such as in the 
presence of pervasive and cumbersome regulations, 
some level of corruption might help increase wel-
fare by improving economic efficiency (Bardhan, 
1997). However, although the positive relationship 
between corruption and economic output might be 
true under certain conditions, it seems unlikely that 
corruption can help the economy in most cases. In 
fact, corruption is generally considered as one of 
the main obstacles to sustainable economic devel-
opment (OECD, 2014) because it distorts market 
incentives, inflates the cost of doing business, and 
harms economic output (Buchan & Hill, 2014). 
According to the OECD (2016), corruption adds 
uncertainty to businesses and discourages the 
entry of foreign players, lowers competition, and 
technology spill overs. It also reduces entrepre-
neurs’ returns, diverting them to less productive 
activities. Corruption further distorts investments, 
incentivizing firms to employ resources in unpro-
ductive rent-seeking activities. Finally, corruption 
leads to waste or inefficient use of public resources.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. 
The next section provides a review of the litera-
ture about corruption in general, and on corruption 
in the context of FIFA and Brazil. A conceptual 
model and its hypothesis are presented in the fol-
lowing section. The methodology used to test these 
hypotheses is described afterward. The results of 
the empirical analysis are presented in the follow-
ing section and a discussion of the results is pro-
vided in the last section.
Literature Review
Corruption
Although “corruption” is a well-known term, the 
meaning of the term “corruption” has changed in 
Western societies over time. In Classical Greece, 
corruption (phthora) was the term used to denote 
the destruction or ruin of something as opposed 
to the generation of it (Buchan & Hill, 2014). For 
example, Socrates was sentenced to death for cor-
rupting the young people of Athens. More recently, 
corruption has gained a different meaning related to 
“the abuse of public or private office for personal 
gain” (World Bank, 1997). It includes a myriad of 
behaviors, such as bribery, economic extortion, ille-
gal gratuities, conflicts of interest, embezzlement, 
nepotism, and state capture (Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 
2014; Wells & Hymes, 2012). Although corruption 
is usually associated with illegal activities, Bardhan 
(1997) argued that both concepts are not synonyms 
because not all illegal actions are corrupt and not 
every sort of corruption is illegal.
Among all forms of corruption, the most rel-
evant and debated one is the economic corruption 
of public office (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). 
According to Bardhan (1997),
Corruption ordinarily refers to the use of public 
office for private gains, where an official (the 
agent) entrusted with carrying out a task by the 
public (the principal) engages in some sort of mal-
feasance for private enrichment which is difficult 
to monitor for the principal. (p. 1321)
These private gains may take several differ-
ent forms, such as winning government contracts, 
earning government benefits, paying lower taxes, 
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Findings of a study that examined corruption and 
its effects on the economy in 67 countries suggest 
that corruption lowers investment, hence decreas-
ing economic growth (Mauro, 1995). The author 
estimates that a one-standard-deviation decrease 
in corruption increases investment by almost five 
percentage points and yearly GDP growth rate by 
over half a percentage point. Mo (2001) argued 
that, besides reducing investment, corruption also 
undermines economic development by decreasing 
the level of human capital and by threatening politi-
cal stability. According to the author, a 1% increase 
in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (Trans-
parency International, 2016) is likely to result in a 
0.72% decrease in the economic growth rate.
Corruption also affects international tourist 
arrivals. According to Poprawe (2015), a one-point 
increase in the CPI results in a between 2% and 
7% decrease in inbound tourist flow. Saha and Yap 
(2015) argued that the relationship between corrup-
tion and tourist arrivals follows a U-shaped curve. 
According to their study, at low levels, corruption 
displays a positive effect on tourism demand by 
helping tourism firms sidestep burdensome public 
policies. However, after reaching a threshold, fur-
ther increases in corruption becomes a deterrent to 
the tourism industry, lowering the number of tourist 
arrivals. A similar finding is also reported by Yap 
and Saha (2013), who examined the relationship 
between corruption and tourist arrivals in world 
heritage destinations.
According to the CPI published by the Transpar-
ency International (2016), corruption is higher in 
countries with lower levels of development. On a 
0–100 scale, the average index of the very highly 
human developed countries (United Nations Devel-
opment Program, 2015) is 67.7, while the average 
index for nations with medium human develop-
ment level is 33.8. For the low human development 
countries, the average CPI is 27.5. The correlation 
between CPI and the Human Development Index 
(HDI) is 0.74. The stronger incidence of corruption 
in less-developed countries and its harmful effects 
on economic growth indicates that it deepens world 
inequality (OECD, 2016).
Although corruption might never disappear, there 
are several measures to reduce it. The United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption (United Nations, 
2004) claims that corruption should be combated 
with a mix of preventive measures, criminaliza-
tion, and law enforcement. One important way of 
preventing corruption is promoting transparency of 
governmental activities. According to the OECD, 
corruption prevention requires the implementation 
of effective accountability through internal control 
and regulatory oversight to ensure compliance by 
the public sector, the private sector, and citizens with 
standards of public integrity, and through transpar-
ency and active participation by civil society in the 
public decision-making process (OECD, 2016).
The OECD also stresses the necessity of spe-
cial attention to riskier areas of corruption, such 
as public procurement, particularly in “large-scale 
projects or major sports or cultural events” (OECD, 
2016, p. 4). In fact, there have been a number of 
corruption allegations in sports mega-events, as 
discussed in the following section.
Corruption in FIFA
Football is the world’s most popular sport and 
a big business. The European football market 
alone was expected to exceed €25 billion in the 
2016/2017 season (Deloitte, 2016). This big sport-
ing event is internationally managed by the Fédéra-
tion Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), 
which is based in Zurich and governed by Swiss 
laws. FIFA’s objectives include the promotion and 
development of football around the world. It con-
sists of six continental confederations, which repre-
sent about 200 national federations and thousands 
of football teams.
Allegations of FIFA corruption dates at least 
back to 1991 when some officials of the organiza-
tion were accused of receiving more than US$150 
million in bribes from marketing firms. In 2011, the 
entity banned two committee members for breaches 
of FIFA’s code of ethics related to the World Cup 
2018 and 2022 bidding campaigns. In the same 
year, the vice president of FIFA and a presidential 
candidate were suspended because of corruption 
allegations. Despite the governance reform process 
conducted from 2011 to 2013, in 2015 nine FIFA 
officials and five corporate executives were charged 
by US authorities over allegations of racketeering, 
wire fraud, and money laundering conspiracies 
spanning 24 years. Several officials of the FIFA 
had been accused of taking bribes and even several 
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senior FIFA officials were arrested on corruption 
charges in 2015. Brazilian FIFA officials were 
involved. FIFA’s President and the head of UEFA 
were prosecuted in February 2016 for mismanage-
ment and misappropriation and banned from FIFA.
These FIFA corruption scandals tarnished the 
reputation of the entity. The organizations of the 
2010 World Cup in South Africa were also accused 
of corruption (Cottle, 2011). Furthermore, in some 
of the host countries that hosted the FIFA world 
cup, public officials and the organizing committee 
members had also been accused of taking bribes 
and being corrupt. Corruption allegations against 
public officials and organizing committee mem-
bers of the 2012 FIFA World Cup in Brazil also 
emerged. Although nothing was proven, suspicions 
were not unfounded.
Corruption in Brazil
Corruption in Brazil has a long history. Deviant 
behavior and the lack of distinction between public 
and private properties by powerful individuals has 
been present in Brazil since it was Portugal’s col-
ony (Faoro, 2001; Holanda, 1995). Although it is 
very difficult to measure current corruption, Brazil 
is not currently perceived as a very honest country. 
According to the Transparency International’s CPI, 
Brazil ranks 76th among 167 countries (Transpar-
ency International, 2016).
The perception of widespread corruption in 
Brazil seems to have been always present. Most 
politicians in Brazil are viewed as being corrupt. 
Although most politicians and public officers in 
Brazil are seen as using their powers for illegiti-
mate personal gains, the poor are always viewed 
as being less inclined to exhibit corrupt behaviors 
(Filgueiras, 2009). This situation resulted in signifi-
cant increases in the perception of corruption among 
politicians and public officers over the last several 
years in Brazil. In 2013, millions of Brazilians took 
the streets in all major cities to demonstrate against 
political corruption. Targets were varied, but they 
included public transportation prices, corrup-
tion by politicians, and the organization of World 
Cup. In 2014, in a large-scale operation, the Fed-
eral Police started investigating, prosecuting, and 
arresting executives of major companies and top 
politicians. Most accusations were related to the 
national oil company, but unfolding denunciations 
spread across several other companies and projects, 
including the World Cup. By mid-2017, the opera-
tion was still going on after arresting more than 200 
people, recovering about US$3 billion, demanding 
the return of more than US$11 billion to the gov-
ernment and public companies, and reaching more 
than 30 different countries.
Hypotheses
In a political system, citizens’ support for proj-
ects initiated by the government can be viewed as a 
source of major feedback. As such, citizens’ support 
is a viable indicator of the value of a project for the 
society as it correlates with perceived or expected 
benefits for individuals and the society from those 
projects. In democratic societies, politicians seek 
significant public support for their initiatives as a 
goal since it is a good predictor of future electoral 
outcomes (Lau & Schlesinger, 2005). Therefore, 
the level of citizens’ support is frequently used as a 
guideline for determining public policies and regu-
lations (Burstein, 2003; Page & Shapiro, 1992).
Citizens’ support for mega-sporting events, such 
as summer and winter Olympic Games and FIFA 
World Cup, are even more important than their 
support for other public projects because residents’ 
support can transform a sporting mega-event into 
an urban festival. On the other hand, lack of sup-
port and cohesion within the host community can 
have devastating effects on the host community by 
turning it into a highly charged political and social 
exercise. Mega-sporting events usually attract hun-
dreds of thousands of visitors to the host city or 
country. The 2014 FIFA World Cup, for instance, 
increased the number of international travelers 
visiting Brazil by over 500,000. Successfully host-
ing such a large number of tourists requires more 
than good management from the government and 
businesses. It also requires residents’ goodwill and 
hospitality towards those visitors because positive 
attitudes of locals towards tourists has long and 
extensively been identified as a critical factor for 
the success of tourism (Akis, Peristianis, & Warner, 
1996; Butler, 1980; Getz, 1994; Kim, Gursoy, & 
Lee, 2006). Hosts’ anger, apathy, or mistrust, on the 
other hand, are likely to have negative impacts on 
visitors’ satisfaction, hence significantly decreasing 
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affected residents’ support for the event. Corruption 
can have two different types of effect on residents’ 
support for hosting mega-events. First, there is the 
efficiency argument. According to the literature pre-
viously presented, corruption leads to public admin-
istration inefficiency. Therefore, it is reasonable to 
expect that mega-events hosted by corrupt organiza-
tions and governments will deliver smaller positive 
impacts and larger negative impacts.
Hypothesis 3: There is a direct negative relation-
ship between perceived corruption and mega-
events’ perceived positive impacts.
Hypothesis 4: There is a direct positive relation-
ship between perceived corruption and mega-
events’ perceived negative impacts.
Besides directly influencing the impact percep-
tions of the event, corruption may also decrease 
residents’ support due to the moral implications of 
corruption. Regardless of its consequences, cor-
ruption is viewed as an immoral and deplorable 
behavior. Thus, a higher perception of corruption 
in the organization of mega-sporting events might 
decrease local residents’ support to these projects.
Hypothesis 5: There is a direct negative relation-
ship between perceived corruption and residents’ 
support for hosting mega-events.
One important factor that plays a critical role on 
politicians and other officials corruption behavior is 
the transparency. A transparent public administra-
tion finds fewer opportunities for corrupt actions, 
as well as it faces stronger pressure from the com-
munity. Thus, higher transparency is expected to be 
associated with lower corruption.
Hypothesis 6: There is a direct negative relation-
ship between perceived transparency and per-
ceived corruption.
Because transparency is intrinsically related to 
communication with residents, transparency might 
influence their perceptions of impacts caused by 
mega-events. If residents perceive the process to be 
transparent, they are more likely to believe in what 
officials say about how the mega-event can gener-
ate significant benefits for the host communities and 
the potential of the event generating positive out-
comes (Gursoy, Jurowski, & Uysal, 2002). Thus, 
residents’ support for mega-events is a critical pre-
requisite for hosting a mega-event in the host com-
munity successfully.
Local residents’ support for hosting of mega-
events depends on a number of different factors. 
One of the most frequently studied is the perceived 
or expected impacts of such events. Because this 
relationship has been widely formulated and tested, 
the present work will not discuss it in detail. The 
reader is directed to Gursoy, Yolal, Ribeiro, and 
Panosso Netto (2016) for a recent review. It is 
important to note that studies have covered eco-
nomic, social, cultural, environmental, and urbanis-
tic impacts, among others. Although impact studies 
usually focus on the positive side of the coin, each 
of these themes is associated with both positive and 
negative impacts (Gursoy et al., 2016). The positive 
economic outcomes of these events are frequently 
overstated, while economic costs, and even losses, 
are commonly underestimated. Although residents’ 
support for mega-events might be influenced by 
different categories of impacts, these different cat-
egories have usually been grouped into positive and 
negative impact perception categories (Gursoy, Chi, 
Ai, & Chen, 2011; Gursoy et al., 2002; Gursoy & 
Kendall, 2006; Gursoy et al., 2016; Kim et al., 2006; 
Zhou & Ap, 2009). The relationship between resi-
dents’ support for a mega-event and positive impacts 
is expected to be positive, while the relationship 
with negative impacts is expected to be negative.
Hypothesis 1: There is a direct positive relation-
ship between perceived positive impacts and 
residents’ support for hosting mega-events.
Hypothesis 2: There is a direct negative relation-
ship between perceived positive impacts and 
residents’ support for hosting mega-events.
As discussed earlier, bidding and hosting process 
of mega-events have frequently been associated with 
corruption scandals. The reputation of the owner of 
the World Cup, FIFA, was particularly damaged by 
such accusations. Corruption is also perceived as 
a frequent behavior in the Brazilian government. 
As a result, many Brazilian citizens had their own 
suspicions of corruption in the organization of 
2014 FIFA World Cup. These suspicions may have 
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Hypothesis 9: There is a direct positive relation-
ship between perceived transparency and resi-
dents’ support for hosting mega-events.
Method
Conceptual Model
Figure 1 presents the theoretical model devel-
oped based on the preceding discussion. As pre-
sented in the model, this study proposes that both 
positive and negative impact perceptions of local 
residents are significant determinants of their sup-
port for hosting a mega-event in their community. 
The model also suggests that perception of corrup-
tion is a significant determinant of residents both 
negative and positive impact perceptions and their 
support for hosting a mega-event in their commu-
nity. Transparency is proposed to have a significant 
impact on perception of corruption, both negative 
and positive impact perceptions, and residents sup-
port for hosting a mega-event in their community.
Data Source
The conceptual model and its seven hypotheses 
were empirically tested by using data collected 
from residents of all 12 cities that hosted the 2014 
how it can improve residents’ well-being. There-
fore, transparency is expected to increase residents’ 
perceptions of positive impacts and to decrease their 
perceptions of negative impacts.
Hypothesis 7: There is a direct positive relation-
ship between perceived transparency and per-
ceived positive impacts.
Hypothesis 8: There is a direct negative relation-
ship between perceived transparency and per-
ceived negative impacts.
Furthermore, transparency can have a direct 
impact on locals’ support for hosting a mega-
event in their community. Because most decisions 
related to hosting a mega-sporting event are made 
by a small group of individuals (Minnaert, 2012), a 
transparent process can have a significant influence 
on residents support. As suggested by previous 
studies, transparency is a precondition for indi-
viduals having trust in government and other pub-
lic offices because a just and trustable government 
ought to be transparent. A transparent process can 
provide assurances that organizers and other public 
officials involved in the decision making will not 
use the process and the event for personal gains. 
Thus, transparency is likely to increase local resi-
dents’ support for the hosting of mega-events.
Figure 1. Conceptual model.
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reliability analysis utilizing Cronbach’s α scores 
(Cronbach, 1951). In order to identify the most 
parsimonious scale to use in the study, items that 
had a low impact on the α estimate were excluded 
from the original set of items. Final estimates 
indicated that all scales are sufficiently reliable 
because their coefficients were higher than rec-
ommended threshold of 0.70 (Hair, Black, Babin, 
& Anderson, 2010). The number of items in each 
scale and their α estimates are presented in Table 1.
Data were subsequently tested for normality and 
outliers. Following Byrne (2010) recommenda-
tions, kurtosis values for each item were examined. 
All univariate item estimates of absolute kurtosis 
were under 7, indicating no significant departure 
from normality (West, Finch, & Curran, 1995). 
However, the normalized estimate of multivariate 
kurtosis (Mardia, 1970, 1974) was 88. Because this 
value is substantially higher than the recommended 
threshold of 5 (Bentler, 2005), multivariate normal-
ity was rejected. Consequently, all of the follow-
ing estimates used the asymptotic distribution-free 
(ADF) estimation presented by Browne (1984). 
Outliers were assessed using Mahalanobis distance 
(D
2
). Estimates indicated no evidence of serious 
multivariate outliers.
A measurement model was estimated using a 
confirmatory factor analysis first. Furthermore, 
convergent and discriminant validities of the five 
constructs were examined. The model presented 
good fit as indicated by several different measures 
(normed fit index = 0.919; relative fit index = 0.899; 
incremental fit index = 0.937; Tucker–Lewis coeffi-
cient = 0.921; comparative fit index = 0.937; parsi-
mony adjusted normed fit index = 0.736; parsimony 
adjusted comparative fit index = 0.751). Conver-
gent validity of all constructs was confirmed by 
the significant loading of all items on the proposed 
construct at the 0.1 significance level (Anderson & 
World Cup games in Brazil. Data were collected 
using personal interviews utilizing an intercept 
approach 30 days after the event ended in order to 
minimize recall bias. A stratified random sampling 
approach was utilized to determine the sample size 
for each city. The number of responses varied from 
252 to 508 in each city. Responses with missing 
information were excluded from the dataset. A total 
of 2,856 valid responses were obtained from the 
residents of 12 cities that hosted at least one 2014 
FIFA World Cup game. In each city, the sample 
was stratified by gender and age in order to assure 
populations’ representativeness.
Interviewers were professionals hired by a public 
opinion survey company. Interviewers were asked 
to approach every 10th person passing through and 
ask the person if she or he was interested in partici-
pating in a survey for measuring local residents’ per-
ceptions of the 2014 FIFA World Cup. If the answer 
was a no, interviewers were instructed to intercept 
the next person and ask the same questions until 
they identified an individual who agreed to partici-
pate in the survey. Interviewers asked all questions 
and oral responses were recorded on their tablets. 
Around 20% of respondents from each city were 
called back to confirm the validity of their responses 
after each interviewer submitted the collected data.
The survey instrument was developed accord-
ing to methodological procedures recommended 
by Churchill (1979) and DeVellis (1991). Items 
for measuring each construct were initially identi-
fied from the works of Prayag, Hosany, Nunkoo, 
and Alders, (2013), Gursoy and Kendall (2006), 
Kim et al. (2006), and Gursoy, Uysal, Sirakaya-
Turk, Ekinci, and Baloglu, (2014). Using a back- 
translation approach recommended by Brislin (1970), 
items were translated into Portuguese. A group of 
tourism experts assessed the content validity of 
these items. All items were measured in 5-points 
Likert scales anchored in “strongly disagree,” “dis-
agree,” “neutral,” “agree,” and “strongly agree.” 
Two pilot surveys were conducted with residents 
of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the two largest 
host cities of the 2014 World Cup.
Results
Measurement scales for each of the five constructs 
of the conceptual model were optimized through a 
Table 1
Properties of Constructs
Construct No. of Items Cronbach’s α
Support for mega-events 3 0.80
Positive perceived impacts 4 0.74
Negative perceived impacts 4 0.72
Perceived corruption 3 0.73
Perceived transparency 3 0.82
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Tucker–Lewis coefficient = 0.921; comparative fit 
index = 0.937; parsimony adjusted normed fit 
index = 0.736; parsimony adjusted comparative 
fit index = 0.751). Because all latent constructs 
were hypothesized to be correlated, fit measures 
were identical to those obtained from the measure-
ment model. The direct effects proposed in the 
conceptual model, as well as their standard errors 
and p values, are presented in Table 3.
As expected, positive perceived impacts had a 
direct significant relationship with local residents’ 
support for mega-events (p < 0.001). Similarly, neg-
ative perceived impacts were inversely associated 
with the support for mega-events (p < 0.001). These 
findings provide support for hypothesis 1 and 2, cor-
roborating a large share of the previous literature.
The effect of perceived corruption on positive 
perceived impacts was negative. However, the 
Gerbing, 1988). Discriminant validity was assessed 
by constraining the correlation between each pair 
of constructs to 1 or −1, according to the expected 
relationship between them. The chi-square statis-
tics obtained in the constrained models were com-
pared to the chi-square of the unconstrained model 
(Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). Significantly higher 
values were obtained from the constrained mod-
els, confirming the discriminant validity between 
each pair of constructs. The mean, standard error, 
standardized regression weights, and corrected 
item-total correlations of each item are presented 
in Table 2.
Subsequently, a structural equation model, follow-
ing the outline presented in Figure 1, was estimated. 
It presented a good model fit as indicated by several 
different measures (normed fit index = 0.919; rela-
tive fit index = 0.899; incremental fit index = 0.937; 
Table 2
Properties of Measurement Scales
Construct/Item Mean SE
Standardized 
Regression Weights
Corrected Item–Total 
Correlation
Support to mega-events
I am glad that Brazil hosted the FIFA World Cup 3.428 1.578 0.815 0.681
I supported Brazil to be host of the FIFA World Cup 3.244 1.667 0.742 0.630
Hosting the FIFA World Cup gave me national pride 3.342 1.603 0.744 0.616
Positive perceived impacts
FIFA World Cup provided employment opportunities for 
local residents
3.640 1.436 0.635 0.523
FIFA World Cup improved public services and city 
infrastructure
2.925 1.556 0.643 0.510
FIFA World Cup increased business opportunities 3.552 1.453 0.706 0.586
FIFA World Cup promoted regeneration and development 
of cities
3.245 1.456 0.669 0.536
Negative perceived impacts
FIFA World Cup increased violence rates 2.986 1.635 0.714 0.518
FIFA World Cup increased prostitution incidence 3.380 1.605 0.688 0.518
FIFA World Cup damaged the natural environment 3.229 1.566 0.664 0.525
FIFA World Cup increased noise, air, and visual pollution 3.571 1.546 0.590 0.469
Perceived corruption
There were improprieties in the constructions for the FIFA 
World Cup
4.352 1.129 0.636 0.532
Some companies didn’t follow the standards required in 
their contracts for projects of the FIFA World Cup
4.417 1.015 0.693 0.567
There is a feeling that there was misuse of public funds and 
overpricing in the constructions for the FIFA World Cup
4.550 0.934 0.736 0.563
Perceived transparency
The constructions for the FIFA World Cup were done 
transparently
2.173 1.457 0.829 0.697
The whole FIFA World Cup process was clearly explained 
by the government and the media
2.470 1.549 0.747 0.655
The government has released enough information to local 
residents about the progress of constructions for the FIFA 
World Cup
2.324 1.491 0.778 0.666
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Findings indicated that higher transparency leads 
to a lower perception of corruption (p < 0.001) and 
to higher perceived positive impacts (p < 0.001). 
The relationship between transparency and per-
ceived negative impacts was found to be negative, 
but not significant (p = 0.063). Perceived transpar-
ency is also found to have a direct influence on 
support for the hosting of mega-events (p < 0.001). 
Therefore, hypotheses 6, 7, and 9 were supported, 
while hypothesis 8 was rejected. Direct, indirect, 
and total effects are presented in Table 4.
As expected, perceived positive impacts is the 
most critical determinant of residents’ support 
for the hosting of FIFA World Cup. Although the 
direct effect of transparency on the support is much 
estimated coefficient was not statistically significant 
(p = 0.069). Thus, hypothesis 3 was rejected. On 
the other hand, the direct relationship between per-
ceived corruption and negative perceived impacts of 
mega-events was confirmed (p < 0.001). This find-
ing suggests that a higher perception of corruption 
leads to a stronger perception of negative impacts 
(p < 0.001). Therefore, hypothesis 4 was supported. 
Hypothesis 5, that a lower perception of corrup-
tion leads to stronger support for mega-events, was 
supported (p = 0.016). Thus, corruption is found to 
affect local residents’ support for mega-events not 
only indirectly through perceived impacts, but also 
directly indicating that the moral and ethical issues 
are critical antecedents of support for mega-events.
Table 3
Results of Hypotheses Testing
Relationship Estimate SEM p Value
Positive perceived impacts → Support to mega-events 0.626 0.036 <0.001
Negative perceived impacts → Support to mega-events −0.229 0.023 <0.001
Perceived corruption → Positive perceived impacts −0.062 0.034 0.069
Perceived corruption → Negative perceived impacts 0.294 0.046 <0.001
Perceived corruption → Support to mega-events −0.094 0.039 0.016
Perceived transparency → Positive perceived impacts 0.235 0.02 <0.001
Perceived transparency → Negative perceived impacts −0.045 0.024 0.063
Perceived transparency → Perceived corruption −0.213 0.017 <0.001
Perceived transparency → Support to mega-events 0.259 0.024 <0.001
Table 4
Overall Effect Estimates
Explanatory Variables
Source/Dependent Variable
Positive  
Perceived Impacts
Negative 
Perceived Impacts
Perceived 
Corruption
Perceived 
Transparency
Direct
Support to mega-events 0.439 −0.206 −0.051 0.243
Positive perceived impacts −0.048 0.315
Negative perceived impacts 0.177 −0.047
Perceived corruption −0.367
Indirect
Support to mega-events −0.058 0.188
Positive perceived impacts 0.018
Negative perceived impacts −0.065
Perceived corruption
Total
Support to mega-events 0.439 −0.206 −0.109 0.430
Positive perceived impacts −0.048 0.333
Negative perceived impacts 0.177 −0.112
Perceived corruption −0.367
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of residents’ mega-event impact perceptions and 
their support. As indicated by the findings of this 
study, although it is usually believed that hosting 
mega-events such as the FIFA World Cup can gen-
erate significant positive net benefits for the host 
community, corruption can easily undermine resi-
dents’ perceptions of benefits and their support for 
them. In fact, findings of this study suggest both a 
direct and an indirect relationship between corrup-
tion and support. Perceived corruption significantly 
decreased residents’ support for hosting the FIFA 
World Cup in Brazil. Furthermore, it also lowered 
positive impact perceptions and increased negative 
impact perceptions resulting in a further decrease in 
residents support for hosting the FIFA World Cup 
in Brazil. This relationship between corruption and 
support clearly indicate that inefficiencies resulting 
from corrupt behaviors of individuals in charge are 
likely to lower benefits perceptions while increas-
ing costs perceptions. This finding is consistent 
with the premise of the social exchange theory that 
individuals are likely to participate in exchanges if 
they believe that the exchange will benefit them.
Findings further suggest that community support 
for hosting a mega-event is an outcome of ratio-
nal, calculated, and self-interested actions. As sug-
gested by Weberian notions of rationality (Weber, 
1978), there are two types of rationality: formal and 
substantive. According to Kalberg (1980), the for-
mer refers to an action that results from a rational 
evaluation of means and ends of that action, which, 
for example, may be reflected in many predomi-
nantly economic decisions. The latter is guided by a 
“values postulate” (Kalberg, 1980) that emphasizes 
noneconomic dimensions and the requirement that 
one’s behavior always coincides with the values 
one holds. As suggested by the “values postulate” 
rationality argument, not only rational economic 
assessments of an exchange but also value-laden 
dimensions, including political and cultural fac-
tors can have a significant impact on individuals 
attitudes and behaviors, including the likelihood of 
support for a complex phenomenon such as host-
ing a mega-event. As suggested by the findings, 
in addition to directly influencing residents sup-
port for hosting a mega-event in their community, 
residents’ perceptions of corruption can lower their 
perceptions of benefits and therefore, their support 
for hosting the event.
smaller, the overall effect of transparency is found 
to be considerably large. The standardized total 
effect of perceived transparency is almost as large 
as the standardized total effect of the perceived 
positive impacts. The total effect of perceived 
negative impacts is significantly smaller than the 
total effect of perceived positive impacts and trans-
parency. Its standardized total effect is only half 
of the total effect of perceived positive impacts. 
Finally, the total effect of corruption on the sup-
port is the smallest among the constructs exam-
ined in this study. Its total effect is almost evenly 
distributed between the direct and indirect paths.
Discussion and Conclusion
Corruption is a major problem in virtually all 
societies and happens everywhere. Although studies 
suggest that corruption is rampant in the developing 
world, it is, however, more prevalent in developing 
countries than developed ones (Samphantharak & 
Malesky, 2008; Svenson, 2004). Developing coun-
tries hosted the last two FIFA World Cups and the 
next two are going to be held in countries of this cat-
egory. Furthermore, hosting of these mega-events 
requires significant investment in building new and/
or improving existing infrastructure and facili-
ties needed to host these events (Jennings, 2011; 
Maennig, 2005; Mason et al., 2006). Considering the 
fact that public works construction is regularly seen 
as one of the most corrupt industry, especially in 
developing countries (Olken, 2005), corruption can 
significantly increase the cost of facilities needed 
for hosting the FIFA World Cup, which may result 
in significant tax increases (Gursoy et al., 2011). 
As a result, money spent on infrastructure and 
sports venues can be seen as a waste of taxpayers’ 
money that could have been better spent on improv-
ing other public services such as healthcare and 
education (Lorde, Greenidge, & Devonish, 2011).
Even though these negative consequences of cor-
ruption can have a significant impact on local resi-
dents’ perceptions of mega-event impacts and their 
support, the impact of corruption on mega-events 
has not received much attention from tourism 
scholar. By examining the role of perceived corrup-
tion and transparency on local residents’ support 
for mega-events, this study advances our theoreti-
cal knowledge and understanding of antecedents 
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cohesion by reinforcing ties within a community 
(Gursoy, Kim, & Uysal, 2004). Thus, support for 
hosting a mega-event is not always the result of a 
rational economically driven decision-making pro-
cess. Rather, it is a product of complex and interre-
lated economic, political, and social factors (Boley, 
McGehee, Perdue, & Long, 2014). Previous discus-
sions based on SET have overemphasized external 
economic rewards and have underplayed the impor-
tance of psychological needs (Woosnam, 2012). As 
reported in this study, factors that do not directly 
generate economic benefits to local residents such 
as corruption and transparency of the process may 
have a significant impact on residents’ perceptions 
of impacts and their support.
Limitations and Implications
This study focused on the 2014 FIFA World Cup 
held in Brazil. Thus, our findings are geographic 
and time specific. Therefore, findings may not be 
applicable to other countries and regions due to 
the differences in cultural, political, and economic 
conditions. Moreover, the relationships identified 
in this study may change over time even in the 
same country due to changes in cultural, political, 
and economic conditions over time. The intercept 
method used to select subjects is another limita-
tion of the study because it does not guarantee 
full representativeness of the population. Besides, 
only residents of host cities were interviewed. 
Thus, the sample does not represent those liv-
ing in other parts of the country. Future studies 
should replicate the design of the present study in 
other mega-event sites to confirm the validity of 
the model tested in this study. Future studies can 
identify and examine the role of antecedents of 
corruption, such as institutional failures, inequal-
ity, cultural norms, etc. The impact of personal 
characteristics could also be analyzed in order to 
understand which groups in the society are more 
sensible to corruption in terms of support for the 
hosting of mega-events.
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Findings also suggest that level of transparency 
in the process of bidding and hosting a mega-event 
is a critical determinant of locals’ perception of the 
level of corruption in the process. Transparency is 
found to influence residents’ support both directly 
and indirectly through lowering the perceptions 
of corruption and increasing their perceptions of 
positive impacts. This finding is consistent with the 
findings of previous studies that transparency low-
ers the risk of corruption because it contributes to 
the clarity of the bidding and award procedures of 
construction of the facilities need to host the event 
by providing information related to the process to 
the public. Furthermore, as suggested by the social 
exchange theory, a transparent process increases 
the trust among exchange partners resulting in 
increased perception of benefits. On the other hand, 
studies argue that the lack of transparency is con-
sidered to be one of the main causes of corruption 
by the public (Transparency International, 2016), 
which supports the findings of this study. These 
findings clearly suggest that destinations that are 
planning to host major mega-events should ensure 
the transparency of the bidding, planning, and orga-
nizing process if they want to maximize local resi-
dents support for the event.
Economic benefits such as increases in income 
and job opportunities are reported to be one of the 
most critical determinants of impact perceptions 
and support for tourism development because resi-
dents tend to pay greater attention to economic ben-
efits and job opportunities than any other benefits, 
especially in developing countries and regions. As 
a result, residents may even be willing to endure 
some negative impacts for economic benefits 
(Stylidis, Biran, Sit, & Szivas, 2014). However, in 
the case of supporting the hosting a mega-event in 
their community, residents also value other benefits 
as important as economic benefits, if not more. 
Some studies suggest that residents view the inter-
national positive image of their community that can 
be generated by a successfully executed interna-
tional mega-event as one of the most critical benefits 
of hosting a mega-event. Some studies even suggest 
that positive social impacts such as community pride 
and international recognition are just as, if not more, 
important than positive economic impacts (Gursoy et 
al., 2011; Prayag et al., 2013). Furthermore, hosting 
these mega-events is also likely to help build social 
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